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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(j) as a transfer 
from the Utah Supreme Court. The judgment being appealed has 
been certified as a final judgment by the trial court pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Order Dismissing 
Case as to Defendants Woolsey, Record, pp. 188, 191.) 
ISSUES 
Whether or not the District Court was correct in 
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and alternatively granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that an 
individual property owner can have no liability to a neighboring 
property owner for actions taken in compliance with zoning 
setback regulations as applied by the governmental entity 
pertaining to the real property in question. 
Defendants do not dispute the standard of review set 
forth in Plaintiffs' Brief for the issue presented by this case; 
i.e., that the standard of review for both an order of dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment under Rule 56(b) is one 
of correctness, with the Appellate Court granting no deference to 
the trial court. Stokes v. VanWaqgoner, 987 P. 2d 602 (Utah, 
1999) and Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah, 1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a case in which Plaintiffs filed suit against 
Defendants seeking alleged damages in the amount of at least 
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$100,000.00, also seeking an injunction ordering that Defendants' 
home be dismantled and removed, and further seeking alleged 
damages based on fraud. 
This is a case involving a dispute arising from the 
placement of Defendants' home on their subdivision lot located m 
South Weber City, Davis County, Utah. Plaintiffs contend that 
the home was placed too close to their common boundary line and 
within a setback area. Defendants respond, stating that they 
worked closely with South Weber City Building Department; that 
the City approved everything that was done as far as placement of 
the home on the lot and construction of the home. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiffs filed suit in Second District Court on or 
about July 28, 2003. Record, p.l. Defendants then filed a 
Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure together with a Memorandum in Support. Record, pp. 8 9 
and 95. A hearing was held on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on 
March 3, 2004, at which time, the District Court granted 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and, m the alternative, as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, pp. 188. 
Between the filing of Defendants' Motion to DJsmiss and 
the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs added 
another Defendant; i.e., South Weber City, pursuant to Court 
Order dated October 28, 2003. Record, p. 117. 
Statement of Facts 
The parties hereto both own adjoining properties m a 
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subdivision known as Cedar Bench Phase 10, located in South Weber 
City, Davis County, Utah. Record, p. 3. In the spring of 2003, 
Defendants (Woolseys) obtained a building permit to construct a 
home on their lot. Record, p. 67. Defendant Woolseys' lot is 
located in a cul-de-sac, is odd-shaped; i.e., five-sided (four 
sides with a radius curve at the front), Record, p. 67. Based on 
the dimensions of the lot, space would not accommodate a 
standard-size home; i.e., the lot is long and narrow. Record, 
pp. 67 and 68. 
Based on the unusual configuration and dimensions of 
the lot, City ordinances pertaining to the placement of a home on 
such lot allow for some leeway to accommodate the building of a 
home on such lot. Record, p. 68. 
Defendants' lot is similar to a corner lot on a radius 
corner. The ordinances of South Weber City allow the designation 
of one of the two rear yards of Defendants' lot to be designated 
as a side yard. Such designation allows for an adequate area for 
building. Record, pp. 67-72. 
Defendants placed their home in a manner consistent 
with South Weber City's instructions. Record, pp. 68 and 72. 
Defendants' home as presently situated is approximately 16 feet 
from the boundary line in common with Plaintiffs' property and 
well within the ten-foot side yard setback requirement. Record, 
pp. 6 8 and 69. 
The ordinance requirement of a 3 0-foot rear setback for 
the line of Defendants' lot designated as the back yard, or rear 
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yard, was sufficiently met and approved by the South Weber City 
Building Inspector. Record, pp. 6 9 and 72. 
Defendants' home is no higher than 32 feet high, well 
within the maximum structure height allowed by the City 
ordinance, which allows a maximum height of 3 5 feet. Record, p. 
69. 
According to the South Weber City Building Inspector, 
Defendants are in full compliance with all ordinances and 
requirements that apply to the construction and placement of 
their home on Defendants' property. Record, pp. 6 9 and 70. 
Beginning April 2003, Defendants began constructing 
their home on their property. Record, p. 2. 
Approximately three plus months after Defendants began 
construction of their home and after substantial construction 
activities had occurred, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against 
Defendants to halt construction and require removal of 
Defendants' home. Record, pp. 1-5. Plaintiffs filed a Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to restrain Defendants 
from occupying their home, which Motion was heard and denied on 
December 5, 2003. Record, p. 155. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard on Mairch 3, 
2004. 
The District Court granted Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and alternatively granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendants.. Record, pp. 188-191. Plaintiffs then appealed the 
District Court's Order of Dismissal. Record, p. 192. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants argue that the South Weber City Building 
Inspector who issued a building permit to Defendants and 
authorized placement of Defendants' home on Defendants' 
subdivision lot did so in a reasonable manner that was not 
arbitrary or capricious and in a way that was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs were well aware 
of the fact that Defendants were building a home for the reason 
that it was located immediately adjacent to their lot. Any time 
after the building permit was issued, and such became apparent by 
the construction activity on the lot, Plaintiffs could have 
pursued the administrative remedy of appealing the building 
inspector's decision to issue a building permit to the South 
Weber City Board of Adjustment. The Utah Code Ann. precludes the 
pursuit of a District Court challenge until such administrative 
remedy has been exhausted. For that reason alone, this case 
should be dismissed. 
Defendants also argue that significant deference should 
be applied to municipal land use decisions. That unless such 
decisions are arbitrary, capricious or illegal, such decisions 
should be upheld, and that such decisions are not arbitrary or 
capricious if they are supported by substantial evidence, which 
was considered by the South Weber City Building Inspector prior 
to the issuance of the building permit to Defendants. 
Defendants also argue that the claim of nuisance by 
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Plaintiffs is untenable. All of the cases presented in support 
of Plaintiffs' nuisance argument are cases dealing with physical 
invasion onto or into the real property of the claimant. There 
is no allegation of physical invasion of any kind in this case; 
therefore, Plaintiffs' claim of nuisance should be dismissed. 
Finally, Defendants argue that the Affidavit of Kerwin 
L. Jensen submitted by Plaintiffs does not diminish Plaintiffs' 
duties as set forth above nor bolster Plaintiffs' position in any 
way. Addressing issues pertaining to zoning decisions is a 
function entirely within the discretion of the city. Though Mr. 
Jensen may have a differing opinion, his opinion is irrelevant. 
The decision by South Weber City's building inspector was an 
appropriate decision. The District Court's recognition through 
its Order of Dismissal and Grant of Summary Judgment should be 
upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
RULING THAT AN INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY OWNER CAN HAVE 
NO LIABILITY TO A NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNER FOR 
ACTIONS TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH ZONING SETBACK 
REGULATIONS AS APPLIED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY 
PERTAINING TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN QUESTION. 
The trial court ruled that an individual property owner 
should have no liability to a neighbor for actions taken in 
compliance with zoning setback regulations required by the 
governmental entity. Record, pp. 189-191. 
Even taking the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
as true as required in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, such facts are 
irrelevant if Defendants simply followed the law, particularly in 
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light of the fact that Plaintiffs did nothing to stop the 
construction of Defendants' home until the home was nearly 
completed. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES. 
A Board of County Commissioners is "...empowered to 
delegate the issuance or denial of such (building) permits to a 
county building inspector, or 'may authorize an administrative 
official of the county to assume the functions of such position 
in addition to his customary functions'....The Board of 
Adjustment is also empowered to hear an appeal from any 
individual seeking to set aside the decision of any 
administrative official or body relating to the zoning 
resolution." Thurston v. Cache County, et al., 626 P.2d 440, 445 
(Utah, 1981). 
" (1) No person may challenge in District Court a 
municipality's land use decisions made under this 
chapter or under the regulation made under authority of 
this chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies." 
" (2a) Any person adversely affected by any decision 
made in the exercise of or in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the District Court within 
30 days after the local decision is rendered...." Utah 
Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001, "Appeals". 
The above-referenced Code section as set forth in the 
Utah Municipal Code, Chapter 9, entitled "Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management", sets forth the procedure by which a 
person aggrieved by a decision made pursuant to the land use 
regulations of the Utah Code may take action. 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-703 grants power to the 
Board of Adjustment to hear and decide "...appeals from zoning 
decisions applying to zoning ordinance...." Plaintiffs admit 
that Defendants began constructing their home in April 2003. 
Record, p. 2. Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed until at least 
July 28, 2003 (as indicated by the date on the Complaint) . 
Record, p. 5. At the time Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint, 
they acknowledged that Defendants' home was significantly 
constructed as follows: 
"7. The rear wall of the home is located approximately 
12 feet from the rear lot line of Lot 153. 
"8. Construction of the home has caused the home to 
rise approximately 40 feet into the air.... 
"10. Many windows which have been cut in the home 
being constructed on Lot 153 look directly down into 
the back yard of Lot 155, owned by Plaintiffs." 
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, Record, p. 2.) 
It is clear that the Plaintiffs were well aware of the 
structure being built on property adjacent to Plaintiffs' 
property, but they did nothing to address their concerns or 
attempt to stop construction thereof. 
The Code clearly provides for a remedy; i.e., to appeal 
to the Board of Adjustment regarding zoning decisions (Utah Code 
Ann. Section 10-9-703) and, in fact, no challenge in a District 
Court may be made until the person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies (i.e., appeal to the Board of Adjustment) 
(Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001) . 
The District Court's Order dismissing this matter 
should be upheld if for no other reason than because Plaintiffs 
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have prematurely filed a Complaint in District Court. 
B. MUNICIPAL LAND USE DECISIONS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
GREAT DEAL OF DEFERENCE. 
". Because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a 
property owner's common law right to unrestricted use of his or 
her property, provisions therein restrict Ann property uses should 
be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses 
should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner," 
Patterson v, Utah County Board of Adjustment, 8 9 3 I .1d ' i'^ , *, o6 
(Utah App . , 1905 K Because there Is a reasonable interpretation 
of the South Weber City Ordinances that was made by the South 
Weber City Building Inspect err :.i n this case, which was based on 
the facts and evidence presented to the building inspector, the 
granting of the building permit and the pl.acem.ent of Defendants' 
home as placed were reasonable decisions. 
Pursuant to statute, "...(3) The court shall: (a) 
presume that land use decisions and regulations1 are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal ll Tit ah Code Ann. Section 2 0-9-1001 See 
also, Bradley v. Payson City Corporation, \ > I , .- < J 0 1, 5 0 i Lit ah, 
200~- > ' illations omitted^ . Furthermore, "When a ] and use 
decision is made as an exercise of administrative or quasi 
judicial powers...we have held that SITOJ iecisnons are not 
arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by 'substantial 
evidence' . '"' Id. , at: 0.1 (citations omitted) . 
The evidence to support the land use decision, in 
question is set forth in the Affidavit, of Mark Larsen, the South 
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Weber City Building Inspector who granted the building permit in 
this case. The evidence supporting Mr. Larsen's grant of the 
building permit is as follows: 
"...5...The Defendants' lot located in a cul-de-sac is 
an odd-shaped, five-sided lot; i.e., four sides and a 
radius curve at the front....Due to the dimensions of 
the lot, the space would not accommodate a standard-
size home; i.e., the lot is long and narrow.... 
"7. That Defendants' lot is, in some respects, similar 
to a corner lot on a radius corner. South Weber 
Ordinances allow designation of one of the rear yards 
to be designated as a side yard to allow for an 
adequate area for building. (See Addendum to South 
Weber City Ordinances attached hereto as Exhibit "A", 
particularly referencing the sketch labeled 'radius 
corner lot', which is similar to the Defendant's lot.) 
"8. That Defendants' home is presently situated on 
their lot in a manner consistent with Affiant's 
understanding of South Weber City's relevant 
ordinances.... 
"9. That the ordinance requirement of a 30-foot rear 
setback [Section 10-5A-4(c)(3)] was sufficiently met as 
noted in the attached drawing. Two sides of the 
Defendants' lot were approved by Affiant for side yard 
setback requirements of a minimum of 10 feet on each 
side. Such placement by Defendants' home on their lot 
was approved by Affiant. The front setback of 3 0 feet 
was met and the rear setback of 3 0 feet was met on the 
northwestern side of Defendants' property. 
"11. That Affiant has personally measured trie height 
of the Defendants' home, and it extends from grade no 
higher than 32 feet, well within the maximum structure 
height allowed by the City ordinance (Section 10-5A-6) 
which allows a maximum height of 35 feet. 
"12. That Affiant has been made aware of the dispute 
between the parties to this lawsuit and has personally 
inspected the home and verified the placement of the 
home in relation to the boundary lines of the property. 
"13. That Defendants are in full compliance with all 
ordinances and requirements of South Weber City that 
apply to construction and placement of their home on 
the subject lot." Record, pp. 67-72. 
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The South Weber City Building Inspector's decision to 
issue a building pernnv w^ ,ci maie i or leasons set forth above. 
Due to the unusual nature of the lot; i.e., long, narrow, and 
five-sided as opposed to a standard, four-sid^d, square <vr 
rectangular-shape:! "Mt , the building inspector determined one of 
the property lines to be the rear line, one of the lines to be 
the front line, and two of the lines 1~o V^ j t Iv- side \ arcl lines. 
Hi" decision i r, issue a Duilding permit and to allow placement of 
the home on Defendants' lot in its current configuration was not-
arbitrary nor capricious and was made only ciftei a thorough 
le^l&v* duo uii trie substantial evidence as set forth in Mr. 
Larsen's Affidavit. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on lhe Harper case is misplaced. 
Plaintiffs state that in Harper,, "...both the municipality and 
the landowner were named as defendants in a nuisance acta on, even 
though the landowner had simply relied on the actions of the 
municipality in approving the contested use of the 1 and." 
(Plaintiff's Brief, } L' . ) Thou g h :i t. :i 11 \; r\.\ c 1. h a t 1. he 
municipality ant Llie landowner were both named as defendants, 
after significant activity at the District Court level and t he 
Court of Appeals, the Utah Fupi erne Court; 1. mally stated as its 
coneI usion a s foilows: 
"In sum.,, we reverse summary judgment on the development 
code claim and instruct the Court of Appeals to remand 
to the trial court with instructions to determine 
whethei: the facility is, in fact, an accessory use and 
thus authorized under the development code. We vacate 
the Order of Removal (of the building). We affirm the 
Court of Appeals' reversal of a nuisance per se finding 
and vacate the jury award based on. it. We affirm the 
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reversal of summary judgment on Harper's due process 
claim and affirm the denial of fees under 42 USC 
Section 1988, and finally we affirm the Court of 
Appeals' reversal of summary judgment on the open 
meetings claim and vacate the award of attorney's fees 
made for its violation and affirm the Court of Appeals' 
reversal of the trial court's denial of the Motion to 
Dismiss, effectively dismissing the cause of action for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief car. be 
granted." Harper v. Summit County, 26 P.3d 193, 201 
(Utah, 2001). 
Therefore, other than to remand the case to the trial 
court to determine whether the facility constructed was an 
accessory use under the zoning ordinance, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed every order, finding, and award that had been made in 
favor of the landowner who had filed the lawsuit. If anything, 
the Harper case favors the position of Defendants herein. The 
court in the Harper case stated earlier that "...the issuance of 
certificates of zoning compliance and building permits is an 
administrative action to be performed by the zoning administrator 
(or his or her representative) and by the building inspector 
respectively." Id., p. 201. Such is what occurred in this case; 
i.e., after a thorough review and based on the evidence available 
to him, the building inspector of South Weber City issued a 
building permit, allowing Defendants herein to construct their 
home. 
II. THERE WAS NO NUISANCE COMMITTED BY DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiffs allege that they have sustained private 
nuisance damages as a result of the placement of Defendants' home 
and because it has been constructed at too great a height. 
Record, pp. 156-159. Defendants dispute that a nuisance of any 
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kind has been created. 
Th^ definition of :,i private nuisance is " a 
substantial and unreasonable and nontrespassory interference with 
the private use and enjoyment of another's land." llanf ord v . 
University of U:ah, 4r,8 r . l,d 141, 144 a1 tail, 19 71 J. 
All of the cases cited by Plaintiffs deal with physical 
invasion of property. The Sanford case i :\i t ed supra) dealt with 
"i iwl.-j.ini Cor damages resulting from the flow of surface waters 
from a University of Utah construction project onto Sanford's 
property. 
The Turnbaugh case, 739 P.2d 939 (Utah App., 1990), 
cited by P] aintiffs involved a claim, by a survi vi rig spouse ol fin 
operator nf" -\ front -ord loader against the owner of the front-end 
loader and the owner of mineral interests to recover for the 
death of her husband when the front-end loader rod led ii ito an 
open pit excavation. 
In the Branch case, 657 P.2d 2 67 (Utah, 19 82) cited by 
Plaintiffs, the property7 owners sued for damages for pollution to 
their culinary water wells caused by a percolation of the 
defendant's formation waters (wastewaters from oil wells 
containing various cherni cal oontarninaj 1 s) intu the subterranean 
water system that feeds the wells. 
All of the nuisance claims cited by Plaintiffs are for 
a physical invasion onh > th^ pi operty of the claimant. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged a physical invasion of any kind. 
As the District Court in this case stated: 
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"There apparently is no Utah case law that either 
disposes of the issues herein or even assists in 
addressing the issues herein...." (See paragraph 9 of 
District Court's Order dismissing case as to Defendants 
Woolsey, Record, p 190.) 
III. THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE 
Plaintiffs cite to an affidavit by an alleged expert, 
Kerwm L. Jensen, apparently m an attempt to put "facts" m 
dispute. Though Mr. Jensen in his affidavit claims to be an 
expert m planning and zoning and is apparently currently 
employed as such by the City of Montrose, Colorado, Mr. Jensen's 
opinion is irrelevant. Municipalities in Utah are allowed to 
establish and interpret rules and declarations pertaining to 
their zoning ordinances. Municipal land use decisions as a whole 
are generally entitled to a great deal of deference. Bradley, 
supra, p. 50. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that "though a municipality may have a myriad of competing 
choices before it [pertaining to zoning decisions], 'the 
selection of one method of solving the problem m preference to 
another is entirely within the discretion of the [cityl; and is 
not m and of itself evidence of an abuse of discretion " 
Bradley, supra, p. 54. 
The City's authorized representative, its building 
inspector, made the decision to allow placement of Defendants' 
home on their lot in a particular manner. Such decision was not 
a "de facto variance" of applicable zoning rules as alleged by 
Plaintiffs, but was a reasonable decision based on the evidence. 
The same principles that apply to determining the reai yard line 
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of a corner lot on a radius corner do, in fact, apply r *' vhis 
lot. To declare th- entile1 myth side of Defendants' lot a rear 
yard would in essence make the lot unbuildable in a way not to 
allow accommodation for a standard-size home. iParagraph 5, 
Larsen Affidavit , 1 ecoid, p. 6 7.) 
The Defendants simply complied with the zoning and 
building rules as dictated by Sj'it I1 h»ehei City's building 
inspector. Defendants did nothing wrong or improper. The 
existing case law supports the actions of the South Weber 
Building Inspector in this case, even accepting the facts set 
forth in Plaintiffs' complaint. The Court's grant of dismissal 
and/or summary judgment was proper in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully request that the District 
Court's Order of Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendants be upheld; and that Plaintiffs' Appeal be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^jZ^day of August, 2nfu} 
^ iROBfeRT L. FRC3ERER 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necesssary. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Robert L. Froei er, hereby certify that the /pjyv day 
of Aagusty. 2004, 1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to: 
Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
P. 0. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Kraig J. Powell, Esq. 
Tesch Law Offices, P.C. 
314 Main Street, Suite 2 01. 
P. 0. Box 33 90 
Park ci ty, Utah 84060-3390 
David L. Church, Esq. 
Blaisdell and Church 
5995 South Redwood Rd. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appell ees 
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